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Weather represents the major source of uncertainty in crop production. With climate
change, weather fluctuations are expected to increase. Traditionally, smallholder farmers
tried to protect themselves against income shocks through informal risk-management
strategies such as informal networks. These offer inadequate protection. More recently,
researchers and development organizations have proposed to combine index insurance
products with pre-existing networks. The social capital emerging from relations within
networks can help index insurance prevail its major issues, i.e., basis risk, a lack of trust,
and limited understanding. However, the nature of these networks, which is informal,
reintroduces problems regarding moral hazard and adverse selection that saw the demise
of conventional indemnity-based agricultural insurance.
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1 Introduction
T he prevalence of risk in agriculture is not new and farmers have, over generations,developed informal risk-management strategies. Farmers use a variety of ex-ante
and ex-post measures to reduce risk exposure. However, these strategies offer inadequate
risk protection against widespread catastrophic weather events (Hazell, 1992; Miranda
and Farrin, 2012; Di Marcantonio and Kayitakire, 2017). Agricultural insurance holds
a special appeal to researchers and policymakers seeking to reduce vulnerability and
promote productivity growth among poor rural populations in regions where rain-fed
agriculture is widespread and financial market failures are common (Jensen and Barrett,
2017). In the future, households in developing countries are expected to suffer the most
from climate-related extreme events due to their heavy dependence on the traditional
subsistence agricultural sector (Aryal et al., 2014; Budhathoki et al., 2019).
The early development and subsequent transformation and industrialization in most of
today’s high-income countries have had successful productivity growth in agriculture as
roots for growth. For countries with a high contribution of agriculture to GDP growth
and a high share of their poor in the rural sector, agriculture still remains the expected
engine of growth. The main message from The World Development Report Agriculture for
Development is that agriculture-based countries should invest more in agriculture to fully
capture its potential for growth and poverty reduction (The World Bank, 2007; Hazell
et al., 2010; De Janvry and Sadoulet, 2020).
Access to financial services in the developing world has increased in the last two decades.
Still, the usage of formal insurance services as protection against income risks remains low
across many developing countries. Data from almost 66 thousand households in developing
countries reveals that only 1.82% of farmers are covered by agricultural insurance. Roughly
three-fourths of the 1.3 billion people living on less than US$1 per day are depending
on agriculture for their livelihoods (Ravallion and Chen, 2007; Mobarak and Rosenzweig,
2013; De Janvry et al., 2014; Panda et al., 2020). The ever-increasing average temperature
from climate change reduces agriculture productivity (Burke et al., 2015). Furthermore,
climate change increases the frequency of weather extremes, e.g., droughts, floods, and
windstorms, making poor households more prone to income shocks pushing households
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further into poverty traps from which it will be difficult to escape (Isik and Devadoss,
2006; Musshoff et al., 2011; Field et al., 2012).
Index-based insurance 1 has received considerable interest from academic researchers,
multilateral international non-government organizations, and national governments for
the past twenty years. Index insurance is a financial product linked to an index that is a
random variable that is reliably measurable, objectively observable, and highly correlated
to agricultural yields. Payouts occur when the contracted threshold is reached, e.g., amount
of rainfall. By indemnifying the insured based on an index, index-based insurance alleviates
the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection suffered by conventional agricultural
indemnity-based insurance, as farmers cannot influence index-based indemnities (Hazell
et al., 2010; Miranda and Gonzalez-Vega, 2011). Weather stations across areas where
index insurances are applied collect data to form indices (Jensen and Barrett, 2017).
Impacts of index insurance have generally been positive where uptake has occurred, while
uptake has been low and in most cases under conditions that were not sustainable (Carter
et al., 2014). Despite its high appraisal, index insurance has not taken off as expected due
to the presence of basis risk, a lack of trust, and limited understanding of the insurance
product. Basis risk occurs when the index does not reflect farmers’ actual loss, which
can be the case if the yield loss is a result of something else than rainfall or because the
heterogeneity of farms is not reflected in the index, i.e., a weak correlation between the
index and loss outcomes (Miranda and Farrin, 2012; Cole et al., 2013; Vasilaky et al.,
2020). Additionally, by constructing an index product to solely address covariate risks,
idiosyncratic risks are left uninsured, which in turn, is a source to basis risk (Clement
et al., 2018). Demand is especially low among low-income farmers due to basis risk (Clarke,
2016; Clarke and Dercon, 2016; Tang et al., 2021).
Informal networks are widespread in developing countries partly due to the historical
lack of access to formal institutions. An example of such a network stems from Ethiopia,
where households struggled to finance their much-celebrated and costly funerals after
the sudden death of a loved one, which has led to the creation of informal burial groups
(Dercon et al., 2006). Another example is the many different rotating savings and credit
associations (ROSCAs) across the developing world. These informal networks provide
1Index-based insurance included: area-yield index insurance, satellite-based index insurance, and
weather index insurance products. The latter will receive considerable attention in this thesis.
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savings and access to credit in times of need for the group members (Banerjee and Duflo,
2007). Emphasizing that the outspread of informal networks is present and due to a
number of reasons, where financial market failure is the common denominator. However,
informal networks lack resilience against highly covariate shocks, i.e., shocks that are
strongly correlated across households within a community or region (Hazell et al., 2010).
These informal networks open up the opportunity to provide index insurance to groups
rather than to individuals. The social capital arising from pre-established networks can
help index insurance overcome its major issues, i.e., group-based index insurance may
alleviate the above-mentioned problems related to individual index insurance. By offering
index insurance to groups, informal risk-sharing pools can average out basis risk in a given
moment. The imperfect relationship between the index and losses creates scenarios where
some farmers might receive an indemnity while not experiencing any loss and vice versa,
and this could partly be remedied by the opportunity to transfer excessive payouts to
a common risk-sharing pool, and, thereby, potentially offer a more attractive insurance
product to smallholder farmers (Trærup, 2012; Clarke, 2016; Santos et al., 2021).
The high information flow within informal networks can be beneficial for group-based
insurance since most members are based in the same geographical area and facing similar
production issues. Insurance is new to most farmers in developing countries, especially
index insurance, where knowledge about the payout requires an additional understanding
of how the index works. Sharing past experiences and learning from each other can
potentially make farmers less reluctant to purchase coverage. Trust is not a trivial piece of
the decision to purchase insurance and must not be ignored, and pre-established networks
provide the simplest form of trust. Offering index insurance to groups opens new design
possibilities for insurance products that are both attractive and easy to implement in
developing countries (Cai et al., 2009; Patt et al., 2009; Trærup, 2012; Dercon et al., 2014;
Cai et al., 2015; Santos et al., 2021).
Within the development community, there has been a growing interest to explore
possibilities to tailor insurance to the needs of the poor, and hence, potentially cover
smallholder farmers against climate variability (Churchill and Matul, 2006; Hellmuth et al.,
2007). If a farmer is expected to be indemnified against crop loss, he is more likely to adopt
higher-risk investment alternatives (Eswaran and Kotwal, 1990; Holzmann and Jørgensen,
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2001; Carter and Barrett, 2006; Barnett et al., 2008; Mobarak and Rosenzweig, 2012;
De Janvry et al., 2014), thus encouraging the adoption of new technologies and facilitating
growth, emphasizing the importance of developing an adequate insurance product. With
this thesis, I wish to highlight the role that informal networks can have in the agricultural
insurance market and discuss the benefits, disadvantages, and opportunities informal
networks can contribute to the challenge of providing agricultural insurance.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of informal risk-
management strategies. This section also lays the foundation for further discussion of
group-based index insurance by presenting problems related to conventional indemnity-
based insurance and social capital through informal networks. Section 3 highlights how
index insurance alleviates the problems that plagued conventional insurance and provides
an example of index insurance. Subsequently, problems with index insurance are reviewed,
which will follow throughout this thesis. Section 4 explains group-based index insurance
and what issues it solves, and, similar to the preceding sections, problems are presented.
This section also provides a parallel to community-based health insurance. Section 5 shifts
focus to the supply side. Section 6 summarizes and discusses. Lastly, section 7 concludes.
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2 Background
2.1 How farmers manage risks
Risk is inherent in agriculture, and poor farmers are faced with a myriad of risks, 2 e.g.,
markets risks, production risks, resource risks, health risks, asset risks, and other risks.
Crops may be destroyed by droughts, harvests may rot in storage, selling prices may
plummet, or a family member may become ill. And, in many cases, farmers may be
confronted by a natural catastrophe. These risks create an uncertain income each year,
which has led to a wide array of risk management strategies. These can be divided into
the two following categories; risk-reducing strategies and risk-coping strategies (Hazell,
1992; Coate and Ravallion, 1993; Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993; Townsend, 1994, 1995;
Barnett et al., 2008; Hazell et al., 2010). An overview of these risk-management strategies
is presented in figure 2.1, which is a slightly modified version of a figure presented in
Di Marcantonio and Kayitakire (2017).
2.1.1 Risk-reducing strategies
Risk-reducing strategies can be categorized as ex-ante measures. This includes crop
diversification, intercropping, farm fragmentation, diversification into non-farm contracts,
and participation in informal risk-sharing networks. Even though these strategies may
prove efficient in risk reduction they can have high opportunity costs and can potentially
lead to under-investment and under-adoption of improved agricultural production
technology because it requires farmers to forgo their most profitable investments (Hazell
et al., 1978; Hazell, 1992; Binswanger-Mkhize, 2012; Hansen et al., 2019).
2.1.2 Risk-coping strategies
Risk-coping strategies, or ex-post strategies, become relevant for farmers once they have
experienced an income loss. Farmers may rely on new credit, liquidating productive
assets, sale of livestock, defaulting loans, reducing nutrient intake, withdrawing children
2This thesis distinguishes between idiosyncratic risk as household-level shocks unrelated to one’s
neighbor versus covariate risk as community shock whereby households suffer similar shocks as their
neighbor.
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from school to work on farms or tend livestock, and over-exploiting natural resources to
meet the repayment of loans and essential living costs. Similar to the above-mentioned
risk-reducing strategies, risk-coping strategies can also be costly. The reason why these
ex-post measures may be especially costly is that informal strategies cannot efficiently
deal with the covariability problem that characterizes most agricultural risks. Within one
community, market risks and production risks affect nearly all farmers simultaneously,
resulting in higher local interest rates since many farmers seek credit at the same time
(Hazell, 1992; Hansen et al., 2019).
Figure 2.1: Risk management strategies in agriculture
2.1.3 Problems with informal risk-management strategies
Although the above-mentioned informal risk-management strategies enable farmers to
sustain a crisis in the short term, they often reduce the farmers’ capacity to build a better
life in the future by eroding productive assets and human capital, thus reproducing poverty
across generations. When the insurance product transfers a portion of the income risk out
of the farmers’ portfolio, they are able to increase in higher-risk-higher-yielding production
technologies. When shocks inevitably hit, farmers that anticipate and receive indemnity
payments have more response options. The high opportunity costs may exclude the poorest
from using these strategies (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993; Morduch, 1995; Carter, 1997;
Skees et al., 2001; Alderman and Haque, 2007; Barrett et al., 2007; Binswanger-Mkhize,
2012; Jensen and Barrett, 2017). Emphasizing the importance of creating a reliable
insurance product.
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Informal networks lack resilience against highly covariate shocks, i.e., the degree to which
the shocks are correlated across households within a community or region. Weather-related
risks are covariate by nature, and the frequency is set to increase with global change
(Hazell et al., 2010).
2.2 Conventional agricultural insurance
Conventional agricultural insurance has historically been considered too expensive for
farmers in the developing world. It indemnifies policyholders based on verifiable production
losses arising from multiple perils. The problems with indemnity-based agricultural
insurance are two-fold. First, since indemnification is based on verifiable losses it requires
high administrative costs to collect evidence and tailor each individual contract, meaning
that economies of scale are difficult to achieve. Second, conventional agricultural insurance
possesses some structural problems, such as moral hazard, adverse selection, and systematic
risk (Valdés et al., 1986; Miranda and Glauber, 1997; Skees et al., 2006; Miranda and
Farrin, 2012; Elabed and Carter, 2015). The above-mentioned problems are especially
acute for crop insurance. Insurance providers can cope with these structural problems by
either increasing the premium or decreasing the value of the insurance for the consumer,
which will be discussed in the following subsections.
2.2.1 Moral hazard
Moral hazard, also known as the ”hidden action” problem, arises when farmers engage in
risk sharing under conditions such that their privately action affect the probability of the
outcome. Farmers’ actions cannot be observed and hence contracted upon (Hölmstrom,
1979). E.g., an insured farmer alters his production practices in a manner that increases
his chances of collecting an indemnity, i.e., buying a cheaper and less efficient fertilizer
because the farmer is covered by the insurance or the farmer untruthfully reports his
losses. The problem of moral hazard leads to increased excepted indemnities for the
insurer. This can be solved by claiming deductibles in the insurance contract, requiring
the farmer to absorb part of the loss giving the farmer an incentive to continue using
risk-reducing production. However, this addition to the insurance contract limits the
coverage and reduces its value to the farmer (Chambers, 1989; Smith and Goodwin, 1996;
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Coble et al., 1997; Miranda and Farrin, 2012).
2.2.2 Adverse selection
Adverse selection, also known as the ”hidden information” problem, arises when farmers
with higher relative risk have the opportunity to purchase the same insurance at the
same cost as farmers with relatively lower risk (Skees and Reed, 1986). The insured are
better informed about their own distribution of production losses, and thus, be better
able to assess the actuarial fairness of their premiums compared to the insurer. A farmer
that recognizes that his indemnity is higher than the cost of the premium is more likely
to purchase insurance compared to a farmer with an actuarially high premium. The
asymmetric information may lead to a situation where only the farmers that expects the
indemnity to be higher than the premium (lemons) purchase the insurance, while those
farmers that expect the opposite (peaches) does not purchase insurance, characterized
as the ”market for lemons” (Akerlof, 1978). Because of adverse selection, the insurer’s
expected indemnity outlays exceed total premium income in the long run. Actions from
the insurer to avoid this problem is to raise the cost of the premium, only resulting
in smaller and more adversely selected pools of participants. The problem of adverse
selection can be especially acute in developing countries, given that most farmers do not
maintain adequate production records that could be used to accurately rate a conventional
agricultural insurance contract (Quiggin et al., 1994; Miranda and Farrin, 2012).
2.2.3 Systematic risk
An efficient and functioning insurance market is conditioned on the fact that each individual
risk is independent of the other. However, this is not the case for agricultural insurance
(Miranda and Glauber, 1997), given the aforementioned covariability problem. With
catastrophic weather events, there is a presence of systematic risk in agricultural production
that cannot be fully diversified. Any private insurer puts themselves in jeopardy of
bankruptcy by offering agriculture insurance with the presence of systematic risk. As a
result, the cost of reinsurance must be passed on to the consumer via increased premium
rates, decreasing the value and demand for the insurance (Miranda and Farrin, 2012).
Reinsurance will be a topic of a later discussion.
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2.3 Informal networks
Historically, there has been a lack of access to insurance from formal institutions in
developing countries, despite farmers throughout much of the developing world live in poor,
high-risk environments (Townsend, 1994) as argued through the failure of conventional
insurance in the preceding section. This has led to a widespread of informal networks
throughout rural areas as a means to reduce risks for smallholder farmers, informal
networks are a valuable source for households to access risk-sharing institutions. These
networks may strengthen their resilience to extraordinary or unexpected costs through
risk-sharing among the members, thus, provide protection against idiosyncratic risks.
This type of risk refers to the particular situation where one household’s experience is
typically unrelated to others in the same community, e.g., death of a family member,
sickness, or unemployment (Trærup, 2012; Pradhan and Mukherjee, 2018). But, when
a serious covariate hardship occurs, affecting whole villages, these informal networks
provide insufficient protection (Hazell et al., 2010), these types of risks are set to increase
with climate change, emphasizing the need for a prominent formal sector in agricultural
insurance.
The most prominent approaches to the reduction of risk exposure from risk-sharing and
self-protection are via informal family structures and communities. Risk-sharing, as such,
usually focuses on self-enforcing arrangements, where incentive constraints and binding
participation typically imply limited mutual insurance possibilities (Fafchamps, 1992;
Coate and Ravallion, 1993; Di Falco and Bulte, 2013).
2.3.1 Group-based funeral insurance
The creation of group-based funeral insurance further emphasizes the historical lack of
supply of formal insurance in rural areas and the need for insurance. Subsequently, how
this has led to a risk-reducing strategy in the form of informal networks.
Funeral expenditure in the developing world is usually large and the financial stress related
to funerals depletes household resources. Funerals are very expensive in terms of mortuary
costs, costs of food, and other items. In some cultures, a funeral can last several days and
households may expect condolence visits for several months, adding substantially to the
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costs, making funerals highly costly occasions. A funeral is a highly insurable event, given
that there is a relativity high mortality rate, death a common event in families with low
covariance and moral hazard is unlikely to be relevant to funeral insurance (Dercon et al.,
2006; Banerjee and Duflo, 2007).
Dercon et al. (2006) study rural areas in Tanzania and Ethiopia, where the creation of
these funeral groups really has taken off. These associations are known as iddir 3 and
they ensure reimbursements both in cash, as well as in-kind, at the time of a funeral. The
number of funeral groups within communities is remarkable, and findings suggest that
most people have a membership of at least one group. In Sirbana Godeti in Ethiopia,
from a total of about 400 households, there are about 30 groups. These associations
have helped poor households in Ethiopia and Tanzania for several decades. Members
of the groups have faith and trust in one another that is built over time. Funerals and
their preparation bring people together, and the meetings related to the groups are an
important means of social interaction, well beyond a simple insurance function. Iddirs
will receive considerable attention throughout this thesis, as they are a great fit for a
group-based index insurance scheme.
2.3.2 Social capital
The norms of reciprocity, information, and trust that arise from informal networks
can be characterized as social capital (Woolcock, 1998; Trærup, 2012). In a similar
fashion, Putnam (1993) argues that social capital facilitates cooperation and coordination,
improving the efficiency of society. The value of social capital can be concretized by
considering a hypothetical village where a family’s house has been destroyed. If this
village has no social capital, the family has to rebuild their house from the ground up,
however, with social capital, this unlucky family will receive help from fellow villagers
(Krishna, 2000; Uphoff and Wijayaratna, 2000). Much like the ”safety net” that Woolcock
and Narayan (2006) refers to when people fall on hard times.
The group-based funeral insurance is a great example of the ability to form local groups to
cooperate to avoid the negative consequences that would occur from purely individualistic
behavior. Following the death of a family member, a household may not afford the funeral
3”Iddir” is the generic name. In some areas, other local names are used, such as ”kire” in parts of
Wollo. They are all referred to as iddir in this thesis.
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costs, similar to the unlucky family in the preceding hypothetical example. But, through
collective action, money can be collected from a common pool.
Social capital is of particular value in low-income countries where formal insurance is
generally unavailable and institutions for contract enforcement are weak. According to
economic theory, repeat interactions among individuals can help build and maintain
social capital. Encouraging interaction may be an effective tool for development policy
(Feigenberg et al., 2013), especially within the agricultural sector (Brown and Ashman,
1996; Narayan and Pritchett, 1999; Trærup, 2012).
There are several dimensions of social capital at different levels within the social capital
theory. These dimensions can be divided into two main kinds of relations, called bonding
and bridging. Bonding can be characterized as social relations between people within
an informal network while bridging is the relations between different informal networks




3.1 The promise of index insurance
As emphasized, there are many different risks that can affect agricultural crop yield.
Indemnifying smallholder farmers against crop loss is infeasible due to information problems
(Bryan, 2019). This is why partial insurance, e.g., rainfall index insurance, is a solution.
Index-based insurance indemnifies the insured based on an index rather than verifiable
losses (Barnett and Mahul, 2007; World Bank, 2011; Miranda and Farrin, 2012).
Index insurance is designed to overcome many of the issues related to conventional
agricultural insurance. First, index insurance is essentially free of moral hazard because
the insured part cannot influence the index through his own actions. Second, since the
contracted premium of index insurance is based on publicly available information, not
privately held information, there is little or no reason to believe that policyholders have
better information than the insurers, thus, little potential for adverse selection. Third,
since the insurance is based on a reliable and independently verifiable index, it allows
transferring a part of the risk to the international reinsurance market in an efficient
manner, even for covariate risks. Fourth, there is no on-site inspections or individual
loss assessment to perform so economies of scale are achievable. Index insurance can be
offered at a lower price, which potentially can benefit poor farmers substantially (Barnett
et al., 2005; Alderman and Haque, 2007; Barnett and Mahul, 2007; Bryla and Syroka,
2007; Skees, 2008; Skees et al., 2008; Hazell et al., 2010; Binswanger-Mkhize, 2012; Carter
et al., 2014; Clement et al., 2018; Fisher et al., 2019).
3.2 Weather-based index insurance
Rainfall is the most widely used index in index insurance contract designs due to a number
of reasons. First, the amount of rainfall is highly measurable. Second, rainfall data is
likely to be available in developing countries. Third, rainfall is correlated with agricultural
production (Bardsley et al., 1984; Miranda and Farrin, 2012; De Janvry et al., 2014; Dercon
et al., 2014). Cole et al. (2013) study different risks faced by smallholders, the most cited
determinant of income variability was rainfall. Insurance contracts only conditioned on
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weather indices can be fairly cheap whilst still offering much-needed protection against
extreme weather events (Hess et al., 2005; Clarke, 2016).
Karlan et al. (2014) study agricultural decisions and find that farmers invest more in
their farms and take riskier production choices when offered rainfall index insurance.
The fact that rainfall insurance is not more common in developing countries is a puzzle.
Since farmers are often exposed to weather risk and such risk is not generally subject to
asymmetric information. Weather risks are different from other risks, e.g., illness or death
in the family because it is not idiosyncratic, and therefore cannot be easily insured away
within villages (Kremer et al., 2019). This puzzle will receive further attention later in
the thesis.
3.2.1 Payment structure
The contracts for weather index insurance specifies a threshold and a limit that establishes
the range of values over which indemnity payments will be made (Barnett and Mahul,
2007). Payouts can be structured in a variety of ways. The most basic is a simple zero/one
contract where the payout is 100% once the threshold is crossed. While a proportional
payment schedule increases the payout proportionally with the deviation from the indexed
threshold. A layered payment schedule is a middle ground between the two (Hazell et al.,
2010). Miranda and Farrin (2012) uses a hypothetical example of a layered indemnity
rainfall micro-insurance contract that is designed to protect farmers against droughts to
illustrate the notion of an index insurance contract. A farmer elects a liability of $50,
prior to a specific closing date which grants the farmer with maximum protection. The
farmer pays a premium of $5, given the premium rate of 10%. In return, the insurer
promises to pay the insured an indemnity that depends on the total rainfall measured at
the specified nearby weather station during the following months. In this hypothetical
example, the contract does not pay an indemnity if total rainfall were to exceed 550mm
but would pay $10 it total rainfall were between 500 and 550mm, $25 if total rainfall were
between 450 and 500mm, and the insured farmer would receive the maximum liability of
$50 if total rainfall were less than 450mm, hence the layered contract.
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3.2.2 Weather index insurance in Kenya
Since the late 1990s, several index insurance feasibility studies and pilot projects have
been undertaken across the developing world (Miranda and Farrin, 2012). One of them
being Kilimo Salama,4 which launched in Kenya in 2009 by the Syngenta Foundation for
Sustainable Agriculture and is considered to be one of the most successful index insurance
projects. 5 Most crop production in Kenya takes place under rain-fed conditions, with
weather fluctuations having a major impact on agricultural productivity. Initially, Kilimo
Salama was offered as a small initiative with only 200 farmers. By 2013, this small
initiative had grown to cover close to 200,000 farmers in Kenya, Rwanda, and Tanzania,
with a total sum of US$12.3 million. Despite this impressive and rapid growth, only a
small fraction of the total farmers have adopted weather index insurance (Greatrex et al.,
2015; Sibiko et al., 2018).
Kilimo Salama offers rainfall-based index insurance, covering Kenyan farmers against
drought and excess rain, this scheme relies on data from automated weather stations to
monitor local rainfall. Farmers are allowed to choose the station that best represents their
farm conditions. The contracts were originally designed to cover maize and wheat, but
products for other crops have also been developed. Kilimo Salama contracts divide the crop
season into three phases, early growth, flowering, and grain filling, which vary in duration
and rainfall thresholds. Contracts are location-specific, and threshold levels reflect the
minimum agronomic requirements for normal plant growth during each particular phase.
If total rainfall in a given phase either falls below or exceeds the threshold, a payout
is triggered for all farmers holding a contract with reference to the particular weather
station. Payouts are calculated per millimeter of rainfall, below or above the threshold,
and it increases proportionally up to the maximum payout. However, farmers are rarely
aware of the exact details of the payout functions, despite all data being publicly available
information. Payouts are transferred to farmers through a safe mobile money transfer
service called M-PESA at the end of the contract period (Sibiko et al., 2018).
As mentioned above, this Kenyan insurance scheme is considered one of the most successful
index insurance projects. Households’ relationship to M-PESA, which Kilimo Salami
4The phrase Kilimo Salama means safe agriculture in Swahili.
5After 2014 it was rebranded as Agriculture and Climate Risk Enterprise (ACRE).
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cooperates with, might be one of the explanations. M-PESA allows for safe transfers of
money between Kenyans and this money transfer service, in which many Kenyans have
established their trust, have revolutionized the Kenyan economy since its launch (Mas and
Morawczynski, 2009; Mas and Radcliffe, 2010). The combination of index insurance and
M-PESA can create trust in two ways. First, since M-PESA is a renowned service among
the Kenyan population, a collaboration may transfer generalized trust from M-PESA
to the insurance product. Second, the efficiency of M-PESA allows for safe and rapid
disbursements, which poor farmers value heavily (Morawczynski and Miscione, 2008;
Trærup, 2012).
3.3 Problems with index insurance
Despite its potential, high appraisal, and practical feasibility of index insurance, demand
has been lower than expected. The various candidate causes of low demand are a lack of
trust, limited understanding of the insurance product, and basis risk (Binswanger-Mkhize,
2012; Trærup, 2012; Cole et al., 2013; Clarke, 2016; Platteau et al., 2017; Sibiko et al.,
2018). These barriers or limitations of index insurance will follow through throughout
this thesis when arguing how a collective approach to index insurance might be a solution
for an increased uptake for smallholders.
3.3.1 Basis risk
Index insurance suffers from basis risk, which is the failure to provide an indemnity that
perfectly matches the loss of the insured. Since indemnification is based on a pre-defined
index threshold, and not verifiable losses, there is no guarantee for the farmer to receive
an insurance payout when suffering a loss (Miranda, 1991; Doherty and Richter, 2002;
Miranda and Farrin, 2012; Clement et al., 2018).
Basis risk can stem from two potential sources. First, farm losses may be caused by other
determinants than what the index is based on. And, as earlier mentioned, there are many
different risks that can alter agricultural production. Unless the contracted index is based
on a weather variable that is the dominant cause of farm loss in a given region, basis risk
will be unacceptably high. Second, the measures of the weather variable at the weather
station may be quite different than the at the farm, i.e., the correlation between the index
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and losses. Basis risk can be reduced if the index insurance is offered in areas where
a particular weather variable is the dominant cause of loss (Barnett and Mahul, 2007;
Clement et al., 2018).
The correlation between rainfall and agricultural production is crucial. The potential
of index insurance ultimately depends on this relationship. The greater the correlation,
the lesser degree of basis risk, and thus, the greater the potential benefit (Miranda and
Farrin, 2012). Demand for index insurance decreases with basis risk (Giné et al., 2008).
However, basis risk may increase with global change due to difficulties in actuarially
calculate expected losses. This will receive further attention in the section of supply-side
challenges.
3.3.2 Limited understanding
The concept of insurance is new to many farmers in developing countries, especially index
insurance, where knowledge about the payout requires an additional understanding of
how the index works (Dercon et al., 2009; Patt et al., 2009). Agricultural insurance
adoption in the developing world has experienced a low outspread and adoption rate (Giné
et al., 2008; Mobarak and Rosenzweig, 2012), further emphasizing that the concept of
insurance is indeed new to most smallholder farmers. Additionally, insurance products
are complex, and low levels of financial literacy among target populations, implying
that not all potential beneficiaries understand its logic (Belissa et al., 2019). A lack of
understanding has been found to correlated with a low willingness to purchase insurance
(Patt et al., 2010; Trærup, 2012).
The market for index insurance suffers from a sincere information gap. Both farmers and
insurers lack access to information that can establish the value of the index insurance
products. Index insurance can be categorized as a credence good, i.e., a good whose
quality is not observable before purchase and at best partially observable after purchase
(Darby and Karni, 1973). Thus, it is a risk of arriving at a ”market for lemons”, where
insurers do not invest in costly but low-risk indices, as there is no market incentive for
them to do so because farmers are unable to sort low-quality products from high-quality
products. This can create adverse incentives, and it becomes difficult to establish ex-ante
whether costly investments in index insurance really improve product design (Jensen and
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Barrett, 2017), which may lead to serious market failures if index insurance is left purely
to private actors (Clarke and Wren-Lewis, 2013).
3.3.3 A lack of trust
Trust is not a trivial piece of the decision to purchase insurance and must not be ignored,
making it a crucial design element of an insurance product (Patt et al., 2009). As
emphasized in the preceding subsection, farmers are not used to formal insurance being
available. Hence, they have historically not been dependent on formal institutions, but on
informal risk-management strategies. As a consequence, farmers do not fully trust the
product or the institutions involved, which in turn have a negative effect on demand (Cole
et al., 2013). A lack of trust is a barrier to insurance adoption for smallholder farmers
(Trærup, 2012).
Trust can be divided into generalized and particularized trust. Where the latter is
households’ faith in other households, but only those in their own community. And,
generalized trust is characterized as a households’ trust in the institutions involved with
the insurance (Uslaner, 2002; Cassar et al., 2007; Trærup, 2012).
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4 Group-based index insurance
4.1 A collective approach to index insurance
Due to the inefficiency and failure of index insurance uptake, researchers have proposed
to offer index insurance to groups rather than to individuals. In this way, the social
characteristics of the informal networks and particularized trust are maintained. This
approach ensures that members may continuously benefit from informal risk-sharing
alongside formal protection against covariate risks. Potentially increasing farmers’ resilience
to climate change impacts (Trærup, 2012; De Janvry et al., 2014; Dercon et al., 2014;
Santos et al., 2021). The premise of insuring groups is that superior information held
by group members allows payouts to be adjusted to reflect the actual losses experienced
(McIntosh et al., 2019). Sibiko et al. (2018) argues that offering insurance contracts
to small groups rather than individual farmers may increase uptake. The subsequent
subsections suggest how an index insurance product may be enhanced by adopting the
strengths of social capital in the form of informal networks.
4.1.1 Dynamic of informal risk-sharing in the collective approach
As opposed to indemnity-based insurance, it is worth pointing out that an index insurance
payout will happen irrespective of any actual loss. There is no guarantee of receiving an
insurance payout when experiencing a loss with the presence of basis risk. By making
use of within-group informal transfers it is possible to circumvent basis risk. The joint
probability structure of the index insurance product and the farmer’s loss creates four
possible scenarios:
1. A farmer experience a loss and the index insurance triggers a payout.
2. A farmer experience a loss but the index insurance does not trigger a payout.
3. A farmer does not experience a loss but the index insurance triggers a payout.
4. A farmer does not experience a loss and the index insurance does not trigger a
payout.
The proposition by Santos et al. (2021) relies on farmers truthfully reporting their amount
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of loss experienced and the indemnity received. These within-group informal transfers, are
the pillars of the collective approach, and they happen indirectly between those farmers
who have received an excessive payment and those who have an uncovered loss through
a common risk-sharing pool. Farmers with an excessive payment (scenario 3) transfer
a fraction of this to the common risk-sharing pool. This allows farmers in scenario 2
to receive a payment from the common pool when the index insurance fails to provide
it, this is distributed by group leaders. These within-group transfers allows to average
out basis risk in a given moment, not just across time. The alleviation of basis risk can
make this design of an index insurance product more attractive to risk-averse smallholder
farmers. For risk-averse farmers, the utility gain of receiving a proportion of the common
risk-sharing pool (scenario 2) is larger than the utility loss associated with contributing
the same amount of an excessive payout (Clarke, 2016; Pacheco et al., 2016).
However, the potential to alleviate basis risk through within-group transfers introduces
a coordination dilemma of insurance adoption. Socially optimal outcomes are obtained
when everyone adopts insurance. A minimum fraction of contributors is necessary before
the effects of basis risk can be averaged out and individuals start taking up insurance. If
farmers are free to defect on their informal contributions, they will most likely do so. That
is, each individual farmer maximizes their utility, in a given moment, by defecting on pool
contributions while still having the pool benefits, given that the other members contribute.
There needs to be a probability that defecting farmers are caught, this is achieved by peer
monitoring. Subsequently, farmers that defect and are caught are excluded from future
pool benefits as a punishment, which provides farmers with incentives to cooperate. Peer
monitoring and exclusion from future pool benefits are necessary for the stabilization of
informal transfers (De Janvry et al., 2014; Santos et al., 2021). This issue will receive
further attention.
4.1.2 Bonding and bridging
The basic idea of the collective approach presented in Trærup (2012) is that the index
insurance provider targets an existing informal network as one insurance taker. The
informal network pays the insurance provider one collective premium and also receives
one payout as one insurance taker. Based on the information flow within the network, the
informal network distributes the payout among its members.
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The collective approach to index insurance can be characterized as vertical bridging since
bridging is created between different levels in society, i.e., between informal networks and
formal institutions. Figure 4.1, which is a reconstruction from a figure presented in Trærup
(2012), illustrates the relationship between the different dimensions of social capital and the
resilience to shocks. The opportunities of bridging and bonding are two-fold with regard
to climate change resilience. First, members strengthen their resilience to idiosyncratic
shocks by bonding within an informal network. Second, bridging among informal networks
and an index insurance provider has the potential to strengthen members’ resilience to
weather-related shocks, which by nature will be covariate. The collective approach to
index insurance strengthens the vertical bridging between formal index insurance and
informal networks (Gittell and Vidal, 1998; Woolcock and Narayan, 2006).
Figure 4.1: Dimensions of social capital and resilience to shocks at the household level
4.1.3 Understanding
The low outspread and adoption rate of agricultural insurance across developing countries
emphasizes that insurance products are indeed new to most smallholder farmers. Insurance
products are complex, and low levels of financial literacy among target populations,
implying that not all potential beneficiaries understand its logic (Giné et al., 2008;
Mobarak and Rosenzweig, 2012; Cole et al., 2013; De Janvry et al., 2014; Sibiko et al.,
2018).
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The aforementioned group-based funeral associations, i.e., the iddirs, appear suitable
for formal insurance products as they tend to understand their function since they were
created on precisely that basis. Dercon et al. (2014) carried out training sessions and
found that in situations where iddir leaders were trained in the benefits of group-based
insurance, there were substantially higher uptake rates compared to leaders who received
training on individual benefits of insurance, in accordance with the findings of Belissa et al.
(2019). The idea is that through mobilizing and training customary leaders, the groups
can effectively share knowledge and leverage trust. The leaders of iddirs were informed
how the index insurance worked, the trustworthiness of the insurance company, and
they were encouraged to share their knowledge with members of their iddir and endorse
the insurance product. The mechanism described may be referred to as the spillover
effect, i.e., diffusion of knowledge of insurance benefits among farmers, informal networks
effectively transfer information about the benefits and functions of the insurance product
(Gine et al., 2013; Cai et al., 2015). Sibiko et al. (2018) conclude that better training
farmers on weather index insurance are needed and that groups can provide more efficient
training. The efficiency of the spillover effect, that is, its potential to share benefits and
knowledge of group-based insurance, is dependent on the level of trust within networks,
i.e., particularized trust. The leaders of iddirs are trusted individuals for members within
a network (Belissa et al., 2019), providing a smooth transition to the next subsection.
4.1.4 Trust
Trust is a crucial design element of an insurance program. This has to do with the
farmers’ trust in the insurance product and the organizations involved (Patt et al., 2009),
i.e., generalized trust. It is assumed that there is a high level of particularized trust in
communities but a lack of generalized trust (Cassar et al., 2007; Trærup, 2012).
Lyon (2000) uses case studies of agricultural production, marketing, and financing systems
to document how trust is created among farmers. The mechanisms include formal and
informal networks of working relations, customer friendship, and intermediaries, whereas
the simplest form of trust is based on existing networks. According to the study, trust is
a necessity for the development of a vibrant private sector.
The social capital arising from informal networks may overcome trust-related barriers
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between insurance buyers and insurance providers. Assuming that information flow is
high within a network, it will create trust (Trærup, 2012).
Trust can be built through a link to a common person. Trusted members of a community
can work as intermediaries and create trust in an insurance product to other members,
as iddir leaders were in the previous subsection. Intermediaries appear as links between
networks and can play an important role for an insurance provider to create a relationship
between farmers and the provider (Lyon, 2000). Another use of intermediaries, stressed
by Skees et al. (2001), Giné et al. (2008), and Elabed et al. (2013) is the importance of
including feedback from community members in the design face. In Mali, for instance, local
leaders helped design a multi-scaled index insurance pilot at the village level. Cooperation
at this level may create solutions to reduce the problem related to basis risk, the cooperation
may build a stronger bond between farmers and the institution that provides insurance
(Elabed et al., 2013; Clement et al., 2018).
4.2 Problems with group-based index insurance
Binswanger-Mkhize (2012) sets up an equation explaining the conditions for index insurance
uptake. Equation 4.1 incorporates the two sources of change in the farmer’s utility. The
demand side conditions are twofold. As a prerequisite, farmers need to understand
insurance, i.e., the insurance product that is being offered and the corresponding payoffs
that they can expect when different events materialize (Barnett and Mahul, 2007). In
addition, the farmers’ expected utility with formal insurance needs to be higher than
without. The utility gained from insurance, in general, is income stabilization, where
agricultural insurance is no exception.
Since the networks are informal by nature, they work under their own rules and norms.
Due to differences in membership and leadership structures, not all informal networks
are equally suitable for affiliation to an index insurance scheme, and, the differences in
the history, longevity, and nature of activities within the networks, further empathize the
differences across networks (Trærup, 2012).
Additionally, in an economy with heterogeneous agents, (i. e., heterogeneity with respect
to correlation of income streams, information flows, trust, norms, etc.), a household
forming its network will not consider all other households to be equally suited as insurance
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partners. Close neighbors or households who engage in the same livelihood activities are
likely to share information and join the same network. Poorer households have less dense
networks than the rich, making them more vulnerable in the face of idiosyncratic risk
(Rosenzweig and Stark, 1989; De Weerdt, 2002; De Weerdt and Dercon, 2006).
Expected utility without formal insurance  expected utility with the formal insurance
(4.1)
The following subsections argue for what determines farmers’ expected value for group-
based index insurance.
4.2.1 Contract enforcement
The informality of the typical risk-sharing contracts means that issues of contract
enforcement and dynamic consistency will be important. There is an issue when the
contract is not formalized, pooling will only occur if those who have the capacity to pay
do not seek to renegotiate the contract after shocks have been realized (McIntosh et al.,
2019).
However, there is a lack of empirical findings on the extent that social networks can
substitute for formal contract enforcement. Even less about how the introduction of
contract enforcement affects transactions traditionally mediated informally through the
social network. This is mainly due to the variation in the contracting environment across
networks. Socially close individuals maintain high levels of cooperation even when contract
enforcement is removed, as opposed to more distant individuals. Individuals with partners
with high centrality behave more cooperatively when enforcement is removed. Lack
of enforcement is more damaging when individuals are socially distant and when their
partners are not socially central (Chandrasekhar et al., 2018).
4.2.2 Group negotiations
The group negotiation process is not frictionless. A successful risk-sharing group is
dependent on members actually sharing risk, i.e., transferring the excessive payment to the
common pool or truthfully reporting actual losses. Thus, the vulnerability of risk pooling
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arrangements to ex-post renegotiation is relevant. Social costs and distrust can make
group negotiations an unattractive way to provide smoothing. McIntosh et al. (2019) find
that a high-trust individual do have a significantly higher demand for group insurance,
but this effect appears to be small. Distrust can account for about one-fifth of the secular
dislike of group insurance.
4.2.3 Risk pooling
The group becomes more attractive as its degree of loss adjustment increases. Even groups
that have the capacity to pool risk may fail to do so. And, if members’ risk exposure
is too dissimilar groups may struggle to maintain pooling. Different risk exposure can
stem from farm size, crop, wealth, etc. If farmers’ risk exposure within informal networks
is heterogeneous it can be expected that some members systematically making larger
claims on the group than others. The issue of heterogeneity in expected risk exposure
introduces a redistributive element into group risk-pooling contracts. This is indeed a
concern (McIntosh et al., 2019).
How much loss adjustment is believed to be conducted and the influence that the
heterogeneity within groups has on pooling ability is noticeable threats to a successful
risk-sharing group McIntosh et al. (2019). Additionally, the already established networks,
which group-based insurance is based on, may not be designed to pool risk (Fafchamps
and Gubert, 2007; Pan, 2009).
4.2.4 Cooperation
According to Santos et al. (2021), there are a minimum fraction of individuals required
for a population to evolve towards adopting group insurance. Individual sacrifices are
necessary to reach the collective target. The dilemma and risk of failure occur when
individuals are tempted to contribute less and save money to induce others to contribute
more (Milinski et al., 2008). That is, incentives for individuals are misaligned with group
interests, a social dilemma occurs (Hilbe et al., 2018b).
It is possible to look at the collective approach through the lens of a game of cooperation.
If there is only one realization of the insured event, e.g., drought, a self-interested farmer
would have no incentive to share his excessive payout or truthfully report his losses, and
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so, would renege on any prior non-binding agreement (Coate and Ravallion, 1993). A
game of such characteristics is the Prisoner’s Dilemma, a game with two players that can
either cooperate or defect. If both cooperate, they each get the reward R, which exceeds
the punishment payoff, P, when both defect. But, if one player defects while the other
cooperates, the defector gets the highest payoff T, whereas the cooperator ends up with
the lowest payoff S. The game is a prisoner’s dilemma if T > R > P > S, which can
be presented in a two-by-two payoff matrix, as Figure 4.1. An individual farmer would
maximize its utility by defecting on the contribution to the common risk-sharing pool,
given that the other player contributes. No matter what player 1 does, player 2 maximizes
his payoff by defecting. Thus, not contributing to the common risk-sharing pool is the
only Nash equilibrium (Hilbe et al., 2018a).
Figure 4.2: Prisoner’s dilemma: payoff matrix
However, repeated games allow for reciprocity, creating incentives for farmers to cooperate.
Reciprocity is a powerful mechanism of cooperation on the basis of repeated interactions
(Hauser et al., 2019). A game that represents the real-world scenario of group index
insurance adoption is the Public Goods Game, where possible heterogeneous farmers need
to merge their individual efforts to avoid a common risk. Heterogeneity can result from
different levels of risk exposure (to natural hazards), such as wealth and distance to the
nearest river. Merhej et al. (2021) study how wealth inequalities impact cooperation and
overall group achievements of a population involved in a threshold public goods game
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with a collective risk. They conclude that wealth inequalities lower overall achievement
rates of a population.
4.2.5 Group characteristics
Informal groups across developing countries vary in size. According to Sibiko et al. (2018),
small groups are better-suited platforms for learning about complex innovations due to
the fact that larger groups often lack the necessary cohesion. If groups become too large
they become more difficult to coordinate which, in turn, creates incentives to free-ride.
However, larger groups seem to encourage more intensive participation in collective actions
(Fischer and Qaim, 2014). Different proximity to nearest weather station varies between
farms, the consequences of this will be a topic when discussing product design.
As emphasized by Santos et al. (2021), cooperation is dependent on peer monitoring.
Local networks may be in a prime position to establish peer monitoring. Leaders carry a
lot of financial responsibilities, so training is, therefore, in most cases, required on the
role and responsibilities of these persons (Trærup, 2012). Yet another challenge is that
farmers do not fully understand when they will receive a payment, i.e., when the index is
triggered, despite the fact that the index threshold is clearly stated in the contract (Sibiko
et al., 2018). Training farmers and creating a better understanding of index insurance
matters for adoption, which is consistent with the documented role of financial literacy
training in increasing awareness of formal financial products (Carpena et al., 2011; Gaurav
et al., 2011; Gine et al., 2013; Dercon et al., 2014). Farmers who are informed about the
real disaster probability are almost 30 percentage points more likely to buy the insurance
(Cai and Song, 2017). Training is essential both for the adoption of index insurance and
for the group leaders to efficiently working the group scheme.
The effectiveness of the training between group leaders and members may be dependent
on the trust between the two parties. There can be several disadvantages in targeting
informal networks as insurance takers. It can lead to or increase conflicts and divisions
within the community or network if the informal network is exploited to serve the interests
of the better households. This can be the case where some better of households in an
informal network decide to exclude a number of households for some reason, e. g., if some
households are carrying a greater risk than the majority of the networks’ members. This
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will in turn making some households worse off compared to a situation solely relying on
informal risk-sharing (Tabor et al., 2005; Kamuzora and Gilson, 2007; Trærup, 2012). The
unequal risk between farmers may lead to exclusion of the most vulnerable and poor.
Risk reduction from weather-based insurance varies between farmers depending on what
crop is insured and the location of weather stations (Heimfarth and Musshoff, 2011;
Clement et al., 2018). Even though farmers have similar risk profiles, they may live at
different distances to the nearest weather station, thus, some farms may structurally
have less basis risk than others (Sibiko et al., 2018). And, heterogeneity in farmers’ risk
exposure affects demand for insurance (Ceballos and Robles, 2020).
Relatives are more likely to join the same risk-sharing pool, as both friends and relatives
group assortatively on risk attitudes, that is, informal networks are expected to contain
farmers with similar traits (Attanasio et al., 2012).
It is more costly finding mutually beneficial and acceptable agreements when members
are heterogeneous of any sort, also, sociocultural heterogeneity may reduce the efficacy of
social sanctioning and trust among group members. On the other hand, networks benefit
from heterogeneity through diversifying members’ risk exposure, pooling risk is more
efficient when members’ incomes are not correlated (Easterly and Levine, 1997; Dercon
et al., 2008).
4.2.6 Farmer characteristics
Farmers are constrained on both the cash availability side, as well as the credit side
(Binswanger-Mkhize, 2012; Platteau et al., 2017). Farmers’ liquidity constraints are found
to have an effect on the demand for weather index insurance products, it limits the demand
(Cole et al., 2013; Casaburi and Willis, 2018; Tang et al., 2021). Smallholder farmers may
be unable to mobilize the resources needed to pay for the insurance premium upfront.
Standard insurance schemes are usually based on farmers paying the premium when their
disposable income is at its lowest (Duflo et al., 2011; Belissa et al., 2019). Belissa et al.
(2019) tests if farmers are credit constrained by allowing smallholders to postpone the
payment of the insurance premium until after harvest. Index insurance uptake went from
5% to 24% when the insurance was offered with delayed payment, similar to the findings
of Casaburi and Willis (2018), indicating that farmers are, in fact, credit constrained.
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The uncertainty of the payout with basis risk is among the contributors to farmers
preferring to self-insure (Platteau et al., 2017). The demand for insurance is very price-
sensitive (Cole et al., 2013; Hill et al., 2019). The reduced premium of both individual
and group index insurance compared to indemnity-based insurance is one of the reasons
for the attention drawn towards this insurance design.
Demand for index insurance seems to be particularly low from the most risk averse
due to basis risk, there is a negative relationship between demand and risk aversion for
poor farmers in developing countries. Optimal demand is zero for infinitely risk-averse
individuals following the risk of contractual nonperformance (Hill et al., 2013; Clarke,
2016). Basis risk is even more important to the decision of index insurance uptake than
firstly predicted due to strong ambiguity aversion and a corresponding revealed preference
for certainty in indemnity payments. Existing research claims ambiguity aversion as a
possible explanation for the tepid demand for index insurance (Giné et al., 2008; Cole
et al., 2013; De Janvry et al., 2014; Cai et al., 2015). Ambiguity aversion can generally be
thought of as an increased degree of risk aversion when a farmer is facing a specific source
of uncertainty, i.e., a preference of known risks over unknown risks (Ellsberg, 1961; Bryan,
2019).
Due to strong ambiguity aversion and uncertainty about whether the insurance provides
an indemnity or not, an index insurance contract may appear as a compound lottery to
farmers. With uncertainty about individual production outcome and about the validity
of the index as a true reflection of yield losses. This compound lottery will lessen index
insurance demand (Elabed and Carter, 2015).
Time inconsistencies may also be a contributor to the lack of demand, and, as with
the purchase of fertilizer, index insurance purchase is an investment. Farmers may
procrastinate, delaying the purchase until later periods (Duflo et al., 2011).
4.3 Community-based health insurance
Similar to agricultural risks, health problems are often cited as a major risk faced by rural
households, which has led to some experimenting with the design of health insurance.
The strengths of community financing are based on three common factors as group-based
insurance. First, social capital, second, the preexistence of community institutions that
4.3 Community-based health insurance 29
cultivate reciprocity, and third, inter-connectivity between local communities and external
institutions (Dror and Preker, 2002). Like agricultural index insurance, community-based
health insurance (CBHI) is a form of micro insurance targeted to people in low-income
populations. CBHI has been developed to address the lack of credit in times of need,
which is found to be catastrophic in the sense of aggravating poverty. CBHI partly relieves
insured members of their duties to search for credit or sales of livestock to fund care, thus,
recovering more effectively from illness. Additionally, CBHI schemes are characterized by
community members pooling funds to offset the cost of healthcare, similar to the risk-
sharing pool in the collective approach to index insurance. Members that share common
characteristics, e.g., occupation or geographical location, pool health risks (Ekman, 2004;
Jütting, 2004; World Health Organization, 2020).
CBHI received much anticipation, however, evidence suggests moderate financial protection
for those involved. The poorest usually left excluded, it is oftentimes the poorest and most
vulnerable who are in most need of such insurance, due to their lack of appropriate risk
management instruments (Gilson et al., 2000; Holzmann and Jørgensen, 2001; Jütting,
2004; World Health Organization, 2020).
CBHI is, like most other insurances, based on relatively small contributions from all
members, which in turn results in a smaller fee when the incident occurs. Entitlements
to benefits are generally linked to contributions. Some people may have poorer health
than others and might benefit more from this insurance. Subsequently, this may lead
to a problem of adverse selection, where the value of the insurance is dependent on the
quality of the pool, i.e., more people with bad health reduces its value. Additionally,
critical decisions within communities or networks may not take the interest of the poorest
into account, exclude them from important decision-making, thus, community structures
may not reflect the wider population (Gilson et al., 2000; Ekman, 2004; World Health
Organization, 2020). Jütting (2004) argues that the risk pool is often too small, that
adverse selection problems arise.
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5 Supply-side challenges
Although much of the focus so far has been on the consumer side, the effects of catastrophic
weather are also propagated through the agricultural marketing chain via contractual
relationships (Miranda and Farrin, 2012). It should be mentioned that the appropriate
target market for index insurance may not only be individual farmers but reinsurers
and local-level risk aggregators. E.g., microfinance entities and other formal or informal
lenders, farmers’ cooperatives, output processors, input suppliers, mutual-aid associations,
and even local governments or disaster relief providers (Skees et al., 2006; Barnett and
Mahul, 2007). 6
5.1 Reinsurance
Index insurance is often promoted as a solution to many of the barriers that are thought
to limit the supply of formal insurance coverage to smallholder farmers (Jensen and
Barrett, 2017). As index insurance relies on an index reliably measurable, objectively
observable, and highly correlated with the loss, these characteristics may be valuable to
insurance providers as a reinsurance instrument. Allowing insurance companies to transfer
part of their risk to the international market in an efficient manner (Bryla and Syroka,
2007; Hazell et al., 2010; Binswanger-Mkhize, 2012; Carter, 2013), even for covariate risks
(Alderman and Haque, 2007).
Because systematic weather effects induce a high correlation among farm-level yields,
private crop insurance markets are doomed to fail without affordable reinsurance. That
is, without proper reinsurance, crop insurers would have to pass on the cost of bearing
the additional risk onto smallholder farmers, subsequently, crop insurance would be too
expensive. Providers of agricultural index insurance prefer to have reinsurers take on the
majority of the insured risk (Miranda and Glauber, 1997).
However, with climate change, there is a rise in a specific form of uncertainty aversion
and associated insurance markups. Typically, index insurance products are priced using
historical data series to estimate the magnitude and frequency of prospective indemnity
6Local-level risk aggregators are organizations that do business with many households in the local
area and thus are highly exposed to covariate weather risks.
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payments, requiring a significant number of observations. But, concerns that climate
change has shifted permanently lead some actuarial consultants to add an ”ambiguity
wedge” to estimate payouts. Additional historical data are unable to overcome this bias in
the estimates, and thus, the downscaling of climate forecasts have proven to be too coarse
to enable out-of-sample validation against established climate change models (Mahowald
et al., 2012; Jensen and Barrett, 2017). This potential change in the long-term trend due
to global change contributes to weather risks, which, in turn, increases basis risk (Norton
et al., 2013).
Evidence suggest that those at risk have a tendency to ignore to probability of the most
infrequent and extreme loss events (Kunreuther and Slovic, 1978; Kunreuther, 1996).
However, this is not the case for reinsurers and insurers. The providers of the insurance
cannot afford to ignore the potential for such events. Donors and governments should
assist insurance providers with contingent capital to address this market failure (Barnett
and Mahul, 2007).
5.2 Regulatory environments
Just like with conventional insurance, index insurance needs a regulatory framework to
provide standards for consumer protection. Clear index certification processes, minimum
capital-to-liability holding requirements for insurer and reinsurers, and a process for speedy
and accessible disputed settlement resolutions should all be included in a standard insurance
regulatory framework. In some cases, the potential clients of index insurance are illiterate,
so these clients have little understanding of formal financial tools, making complicated
contracts a barrier to insurance coverage while adding little consumer protection. Much
like with microfinance products, the characteristics of index insurance are in need of
special consideration. Allowing for unconventional insurance agents such as NGOs
or microfinance institutions and setting appropriate policies on reserve holding and
documentation requirements should be considered. An index insurance provider can
potentially face regulatory risk, i.e., an interaction of uncertainty and regulation that
changes the cost of financing. In countries where existing legal and regulatory systems are
highly developed, index insurance may not be supported because losses and indemnity
payments are not necessarily tied (Ergas et al., 2001; Barnett and Mahul, 2007; Hazell
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5.3 Product design
Designing index insurance contracts are extremely complex, partly due to the effort
required to identify an index that highly correlates with agricultural yields (Barnett and
Mahul, 2007; Hazell et al., 2010). Weather-related shocks appear to be the main focus
for many index insurance products as exogenous rainfall and temperature levels and
timing pose a primary risk for smallholder farmers, as mentioned earlier. Index insurance
explicitly insures against covariate shocks, e.g., rainfall and temperature, so the nature of
weather-related shocks is well-suited. Additionally, the data required for the insurance
product is typically available at low or no cost to researchers and insurance providers from
satellite platforms and terrestrial meteorological station networks. The data available is
abundant, high-frequency historical and near-real-time weather data, so the availability
of accurate historical data is critical. Developing a high-quality index insurance product
requires signals that are highly correlated with covariate losses. Actuarial calculations
require long series of historical data, up to 30-50 years of data are often cited as the
minimum requirement for high-accuracy estimates. This requirement largely excludes
indices that use newer, more sophisticated data, remotely sensed data, and the option
of building indices from data generated by newly installed weather stations (Jensen and
Barrett, 2017). Historical weather data are the primary pre-requisite for designing and
pricing weather-based index insurance. However, low-income countries may have a limited
number of weather stations and thus lack complete rainfall data (Clement et al., 2018).
One of the major challenges for index insurance is the presence of basis risk, it is a direct
result of the reduced data and monitoring requirements for index insurance, i.e., basis risk
arising from design error. Basis risk causes both unindemnified losses and unwarranted
indemnity payments. An index that is highly correlated with the insured risk is necessary
to offer a product with minimized basis risk. Using rainfall-based index insurance has
shown a very considerable risk-reducing effect when the contracted weather station is
located in close proximity. However, this positive effect is reduced when due to basis risk
when the distance increases slightly (Musshoff et al., 2011).
It is crucial to maintain cost savings, but high coverage and low costs are, in general, in
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conflict with each other. The index needs to be exogenous. Even if an index perfectly covers
all covariate risks, the insurance product leaves households vulnerable to idiosyncratic
risks. Farmers in a heterogeneous population have different vulnerabilities to idiosyncratic
shocks and may value the insurance product differently. Due to a moderate correlation
between losses and payouts, an index insurance product could potentially be more of a
lottery ticket than an insurance policy when adding the errors in the index estimates and
the coverage of the costs and profit margins of the insurer (Miranda, 1991; De Janvry
et al., 2014; Jensen et al., 2016; Jensen and Barrett, 2017). It is expected to encounter
basis risk when the index is only dependent on one variable (i.e., rainfall) and there are
missing values in weather data (Kellner and Musshoff, 2011; Clement et al., 2018).
The aforementioned ambiguity may once again be of relevance. Developers of the insurance
use historical data to estimate farm-level losses, however, since climate change may increase
the frequency and vigor of the shocks, it may be hard to make an actuarial estimate.
Revisiting the example of the pilot program in Mali, where feedback from community
members was a part of the design face. Establishing a dynamic relationship between the
insurance providers and the community may improve the actuarial estimates through
cooperation.
According to Musshoff et al. (2011), different valuation methods for weather indices can
provide different prices. Consequently, no unique price is found that market participants
regard as fair. This may provide a hurdle for orientation for other potential market
participants.
Clement et al. (2018) recommend improving policyholders’ access to information about
their risk and measures they can take to limit risk. By approaching informal networks as
one insurance taker, group leaders can receive training on this knowledge and efficiently,
via the spillover effect, provide smallholder farmers with a greater understanding of the
risks. Thus, create an enabling environment for a well-functioning insurance market.
5.4 Implementation
Even though the concept of index insurance is fairly simple, effective implementation of
index insurance is not at all simple. The challenges regarding the implementation of index
insurance are two-fold.
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First, insurance products are somewhat new to many smallholder farmers in rural areas,
especially index insurance. In addition, urban insurers are typically unfamiliar with the
rural customer base they are trying to offer these products to. Prior to the sale of any
insurance product, both sales agents and potential clients need to be educated on the new
product. The potentially illiterate customer base can again pose a challenge. To further
complicate it, local clients may not trust insurance agents from different ethnic groups
or other regions, i.e., lack of generalized trust. There is a need for insurance firms with
both the desire and capacity to sell insurance on the ground in rural communities. Many
of these issues are already covered in the preceding sections (Barnett and Mahul, 2007;
Jensen and Barrett, 2017).
Second, the implementation of an insurance scheme faces a free-rider problem, i.e.,
sunk costs related to the implementation triggers incentives to let other firms lay the
groundwork, thus, many rural areas become trapped in a low-level equilibrium with no
available insurance product. 7 This explains why governments and donors have funded
pilot projects and studies of weather-based index insurance products throughout its
start-up phase (Barnett and Mahul, 2007; Jensen and Barrett, 2017).
However, a pilot program that was successfully able to implement index insurance was
Kilimo Salami in Kenya. This can partly be due to smallholder farmers’ relationship
with M-PESA, which was created based upon a consumer need, the trust related to
this institution may be transferred to the index insurance product (Morawczynski and
Miscione, 2008; Sibiko et al., 2018).
7Similarly, potential clients for index products also often report the desire to wait and see how the
product performs as their reason for not purchasing index insurance coverage.
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6.1 Summary
Informal risk-management strategies alone will eventually come up short with the reported
higher frequency of weather extremes and increased average temperature affecting whole
villages. The message from the Agricultural for Development report is that developing
countries need to invest more in agriculture to reach their growth potential and poverty
reduction (The World Bank, 2007). Access to insurance seems to encourage farmers to
adopt higher-yielding and higher-risk investment alternatives (Eswaran and Kotwal, 1990;
Barnett et al., 2008; Mobarak and Rosenzweig, 2012; De Janvry et al., 2014). Index-based
weather insurance is very much a work in progress. The gap between high promises and low
take-up remains large, creating one of the most fascinating current puzzles in developing
countries (De Janvry et al., 2014). Relying on social networks to rapidly multiply their
effect on knowledge by other members can be an effective strategy to increase the adoption
of new insurance products (Cai et al., 2015).
To successfully scale up an index insurance product, it is expected to have minimal basis
risk, be affordable and easy to understand, provide extensive coverage, and deliver this
against a background of limited capacity, weak distribution and regulatory systems, and
limited contract skills (Hellmuth et al., 2009). Developers and providers of insurance
products face challenges in terms of weak regulatory environments, covariate risks that
need to be re-insured, designing a product with minimal basis risk, and implementing a
product in markets that lack experience with insurance (Jensen and Barrett, 2017).
The low outspread and adoption rate of agricultural insurance across developing countries
(Giné et al., 2008; Mobarak and Rosenzweig, 2012; Cole et al., 2013) emphasizes that the
concept of insurance is indeed new to most smallholder farmers. Additionally, financial
illiteracy is common among farmers in rural areas across the developing world, which has
led to a lack of trust and limited understanding of insurance being general explanations
to the low insurance uptake rates (Cai et al., 2009; Dercon et al., 2011, 2014). Index
insurance also faces a crucial challenge in basis risk, i.e., contractual non-performance.
The not-perfect correlation between the contracted index and yield creates scenarios where
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farmers might not receive indemnification that matches their losses. A farmer who is
extremely risk-averse will put a lot of weight in the event of being absolutely worse off, i.e.,
purchasing insurance and suffering a crop loss but receiving no indemnity (Doherty and
Schlesinger, 1991; Giné et al., 2008; Binswanger-Mkhize, 2012; Cole et al., 2013; Clarke,
2016), where ambiguity aversion act as an increased degree of risk aversion (Cai et al.,
2015; Elabed and Carter, 2015; Bryan, 2019).
Offering index insurance to already established informal networks, such as the funeral
societies in Ethiopia (Dercon et al., 2006, 2014), creates new possibilities for the insurance
product design that is both attractive and easy to implement in developing countries
(Santos et al., 2021). Group-based index insurance has the potential to reduce barriers
related to a lack of trust, creating a better understanding of the insurance product,
and alleviating basis risk (Trærup, 2012). Within a social network, farmers can diffuse
knowledge on insurance benefits and share experiences among members (Cai et al., 2015).
Insurance has shown to have substantially higher take-up rates when group leaders have
been trained about insurance benefits (Gaurav et al., 2011; Gine et al., 2013; Dercon
et al., 2014). Limited trust can be viewed as a transaction cost between the provider
and purchaser of insurance, which is why building stronger trust is a key component of
a successful insurance product. Trust can be built through several pathways, whereas
the simplest form of trust is based on pre-existing networks (Lyon, 2000). There are
major information advantages with the collective approach, knowing when and how much
assistance each member needs can lead to more rapid payouts, which has shown to establish
trust. Rapid disbursements are heavily valued by poor and liquidity-constrained farmers.
Identifying networks with a strong trust base appears to be a key to the success of a
collective approach to index insurance (Giné et al., 2008; Trærup, 2012).
It is possible to use the superior information held by group members to allow payouts to be
adjusted to reflect actual losses in group index insurance. Alleviating the much troublesome
basis risk by averaging it out over time. This can happen through a redistribute element
like an informal risk-sharing pool or by targeting informal networks as one insurance taker
(Trærup, 2012; McIntosh et al., 2019; Santos et al., 2021).
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6.2 Discussion
A long-standing hypothesis is that pre-existing informal risk-sharing arrangements in
poor populations either reduce the demand for formal insurance or prevent markets from
being established. If the informal risk-management strategies work so well that they fully
insure farmers’ consumption levels and are inexpensive, farmers would have little demand
for agricultural insurance. However, if informal networks are better able to monitor risk
behavior than formal insurers, then both formal and informal insurance contracts can
coexist and increase welfare. Informal networks may be in a prime position to create
incentives to cooperate through peer monitoring, exclusion from future pool benefits, and
norms of reciprocity. However, the relationship between actions and outcomes may be
imperfectly known, creating imperfect monitoring, subsequently, moral hazard remains a
problem (Binswanger-Mkhize, 2012; Mobarak and Rosenzweig, 2012).
Index insurance may have a crowding-out effect on informal risk-sharing, which in turn,
will lead to reduced risk-taking. If risk-taking is not contractible among members of the
informal network, the residual idiosyncratic risk that the index insurance does not cover
may be plagued by hidden actions among members, thus, the introduction of formal index
insurance may change the degree of risk-sharing. It may impose a negative externality on
other farmers in the group when one farmer increases his risk-taking as they share risk.
Also, index insurance may have unintended and adverse consequences as the reduction
of covariate risk provides incentives for individual farmers to increase their risk-taking.
To counter this, informal risk-sharing arrangements need to mitigate the higher residual
idiosyncratic risk by reducing the amount of idiosyncratic risk pooling (Arnott and Stiglitz,
1991; Boucher and Delpierre, 2014). De Janvry et al. (2014) argues that the existence
of an informal risk-sharing network increases the demand for index insurance when the
informal risk-sharing covers idiosyncratic risks, which reduces basis risk. According to
Santos et al. (2021) the interplay between formal and informal instruments, particularly
knowing whether one crowds out the other, remains an open question and is the subject
of extensive research.
When a member of a risk-sharing group purchases insurance, this can have a dynamic effect
on the group, which in turn, can have an effect on demand. An insured member is better
protected against shocks and could potentially help the group more often, thus being
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more interesting for the group. In that way, insurance participation could be encouraged
by group members. However, members might have incentives to leave the group because
formal insurance and informal risk-sharing are substitutes, which in turn reduces the
effectiveness of the risk-sharing agreement (Fafchamps, 1992; De Bock and Gelade, 2012).
Additionally, purchasing weather index insurance may lead to a free-rider problem, where
one farmer reduces its investment in social capital after purchasing the index insurance
(De Janvry et al., 2014; Nigus et al., 2018).
For group-based index insurance to be a valid risk-management option for farmers it needs
to provide value, this can be reflected through the willingness to pay. McIntosh et al.
(2019) study the demand for group insurance. By presenting farmers with a group index
insurance product that is precisely comparable to an individual index insurance product
they were able to estimate that the willingness to pay is $5.21 lower for group insurance
than for individual index insurance. Farmers would prefer to be insured individually,
ceteris paribus. This finding entitles to question the different factors determining the
demand for group insurance. Reasons for the dislike can be any of the issues that have
been highlighted in earlier sections.
However, willingness to pay studies that are not backed with an actual insurance product
suffer one major drawback, they do not necessarily reflect actual behavior. Farmers may,
in fact, act very differently when faced with an actual insurance product (Breidert et al.,
2006; Hill et al., 2013; McIntosh et al., 2013). This survey bias is highly relevant for
group-based index insurance in developing countries due to the lack of experience, limited
knowledge of index insurance products, and few pilot programs. Sibiko et al. (2018) argues
that choice experiments of farmers’ actual response to contractual designs of weather
index schemes would provide important insights, but acknowledges the lack of availability
of observational data.
While it is accepted that informal networks are important for the creation of social capital,
there is a danger for a romanticized view of networks. It is important to state the fact
that civil society is an arena for social contestation in which power struggles exist and
affect which groups control which resources and what they do. Additionally, there is an
issue of who is included and excluded in certain groups or networks. Trust is generally
viewed as positive, but it does possess some liabilities. Trust can be misused and create
6.2 Discussion 39
the opportunity for cheating where information on the other party is a key resource (Amin,
1996; Lyon, 2000; Granovetter, 2018).
There may be individual farmers adopting formal insurance while defecting on their
contributions to the informal risk-sharing pool (Santos et al., 2021). While index insurance
is based on formal contract enforcement, these informal within-group transfers depend on
honest behavior from members. Informal networks use norms of reciprocity and social
exclusion as contract enforcement, however, this may vary in efficiency depending on
group size and relations between members (Greif, 1993; Chandrasekhar et al., 2018).
The socially optimal outcome is achieved when everyone adopts the collective approach
and contributes to the common risk-sharing pool, in this way, farmers that do not receive
indemnification for their losses can potentially be compensated via within-group transfers
(Santos et al., 2021). However, as the ”tragedy of commons” insinuates, farmers may act
independently according to their own self-interest (Ostrom, 1990; Narayan and Pritchett,
1999; Hilbe et al., 2018b). If farmers do defect on contribution, the benefits of group-based
insurance are hampered, this reintroduces problems related to basis risk.
The lack of pilot programs for group-based index insurance has made it useful to draw a
parallel to a similar design of health insurance. But, despite much hope, community-based
health insurance, according to World Health Organization (2020), has contributed only
to moderate access to health care. This is, among other things, due to adverse selection,
showing that the reintroduction to this problem could be a threat against group-based
insurance products.
The attractiveness of group insurance is dependent on the extent it can pool risk, i.e.,
a higher degree of loss adjustment result in a more attractive product. Larger groups
have a higher degree of loss adjustment. However, there is no guaranteed degree of this
loss adjustment because it depends on the size of the payout (McIntosh et al., 2019).
Ambiguity-averse farmers may struggle to assess whether group-based index insurance
actually reduces risk, given the uncertainty related to the degree of loss adjustment
(Elabed and Carter, 2015; Bryan, 2019).
Group size is also a variable in the degree of learning within groups (Sibiko et al., 2018)
and the incentives to participate in collective actions (Fischer and Qaim, 2014). Farmers
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within the same groups have shared interests, which means that a farmer’s insurance
purchase may exert positive externalities on fellow farmers. Larger groups may create
greater incentives to free-ride, i.e., a farmer reducing its investment in social capital
ex-post of an index insurance purchase (De Janvry et al., 2014; Nigus et al., 2018).
There is an issue that some farmers may systematically make larger claims on the common
risk-sharing pools than others, stemming from the dissimilarities in risk exposure (McIntosh
et al., 2019).Those farmers that systematically lose on the group contract may prefer
individual insurance, thus, potentially creating a ”market for lemons” where superior
information held by individual farmers leaves only farmers with high exposure to basis
risk left in the group, i.e., ”lemons” (Akerlof, 1978). However, this is only speculative, and,
as Attanasio et al. (2012) find, individuals with similar attitudes tend to form groups,
leaving less room for dissimilarities.
Binswanger-Mkhize (2012) ends on a pessimistic note where standard recommendations
for improved index-based insurance are presented, i.e., reducing basis risk, moving to
broader indices, improving farmers’ understanding of the insurance, improving weather
data, and transaction costs. It is argued that none of the above will do anything to
overcome the inability of the poor farmers to buy insurance. The price of the premium
and the value of the insurance may, respectively, be increased and decreased as a response
to the reintroduction of moral hazard and adverse selection. The puzzling low demand for
index insurance may be a result of insurance that is simply too expensive for the poorest
farmer. Insurance participation is, in fact, not cost-free, requiring a minimum of income
that the most disadvantaged often do not have at their disposal, possibly excluding the
poorest and most vulnerable. Additionally, better-off farmers may already be well insured
via informal mechanisms, leaving only farmers with intermediate values of wealth suitable
for purchasing insurance. A possible solution, and what donors and policymakers should
be aware of, is interlinking insurance with social funds (Jütting, 2004).
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7 Conclusion
Index insurance may be improved by adopting some of the strengths of social capital
in the form of informal networks. A lack of trust and limited understanding of the
insurance product are important barriers that need to be crossed for insurance adoption
by smallholder farmers. Additionally, within-group risk transfers seem to alleviate basis
risk, but only to a certain extent and with no guarantees. The nature of these networks
reintroduce problems regarding moral hazard and asymmetric information that led to




Akerlof, G. A. (1978). The market for “lemons”: Quality uncertainty and the market
mechanism. In Diamond, P. and Rothschild, M., editors, Uncertainty in economics,
pages 235–251. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Alderman, H. and Haque, T. (2007). Insurance against covariate shocks: The role of
index-based insurance in social protection in low-income countries of africa. The World
Bank Working Papers.
Amin, A. (1996). Beyond associative democracy. New Political Economy, 1(3):309–333.
Arnott, R. and Stiglitz, J. E. (1991). Moral hazard and nonmarket institutions:
Dysfunctional crowding out of peer monitoring? The American Economic Review,
81(1):179–190.
Aryal, S., Cockfield, G., and Maraseni, T. N. (2014). Vulnerability of himalayan
transhumant communities to climate change. Climatic Change, 125(2):193–208.
Attanasio, O., Barr, A., Cardenas, J. C., Genicot, G., and Meghir, C. (2012). Risk pooling,
risk preferences, and social networks. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics,
4(2):134–67.
Banerjee, A. V. and Duflo, E. (2007). The economic lives of the poor. Journal of economic
perspectives, 21(1):141–168.
Bardsley, P., Abey, A., and Davenport, S. V. (1984). The economics of insuring crops
against drought. Australian Journal of Agricultural Economics, 28(1):1–14.
Barnett, B. J., Barrett, C. B., and Skees, J. R. (2008). Poverty traps and index-based
risk transfer products. World Development, 36(10):1766–1785.
Barnett, B. J., Black, J. R., Hu, Y., and Skees, J. R. (2005). Is area yield insurance
competitive with farm yield insurance? Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics,
pages 285–301.
Barnett, B. J. and Mahul, O. (2007). Weather index insurance for agriculture and
rural areas in lower-income countries. American Journal of Agricultural Economics,
89(5):1241–1247.
Barrett, C. B., Barnett, B. J., Carter, M. R., Chantarat, S., Hansen, J. W., Mude, A. G.,
Osgood, D., Skees, J. R., Turvey, C. G., and Ward, M. N. (2007). Poverty traps and
climate risk: limitations and opportunities of index-based risk financing. IRI Technical
report, (07-02).
Belissa, T., Bulte, E., Cecchi, F., Gangopadhyay, S., and Lensink, R. (2019). Liquidity
constraints, informal institutions, and the adoption of weather insurance: A randomized
controlled trial in ethiopia. Journal of Development Economics, 140:269–278.
Binswanger-Mkhize, H. P. (2012). Is there too much hype about index-based agricultural
insurance? Journal of Development studies, 48(2):187–200.
Boucher, S. and Delpierre, M. (2014). The impact of index-based insurance on informal
risk-sharing arrangement. Luxembourg Institute of Socio-Economic Research (LISER)
Working Paper Series, 13.
References 43
Breidert, C., Hahsler, M., and Reutterer, T. (2006). A review of methods for measuring
willingness-to-pay. Innovative Marketing, 2(4):8–32.
Brown, L. D. and Ashman, D. (1996). Participation, social capital, and intersectoral
problem solving: African and asian cases. World development, 24(9):1467–1479.
Bryan, G. (2019). Ambiguity aversion decreases the impact of partial insurance: Evidence
from african farmers. Journal of the European Economic Association, 17(5):1428–1469.
Bryla, E. and Syroka, J. (2007). Developing index-based insurance for agriculture in
developing countries. Sustainable Development Innovation Brief, 2.
Budhathoki, N. K., Lassa, J. A., Pun, S., and Zander, K. K. (2019). Farmers’ interest
and willingness-to-pay for index-based crop insurance in the lowlands of nepal. Land
Use Policy, 85:1–10.
Burke, M., Hsiang, S. M., and Miguel, E. (2015). Global non-linear effect of temperature
on economic production. Nature, 527(7577):235–239.
Cai, H., Chen, Y., Fang, H., and Zhou, L.-A. (2009). Microinsurance, trust and economic
development: Evidence from a randomized natural field experiment. National Bureau
of Economic Research.
Cai, J., De Janvry, A., and Sadoulet, E. (2015). Social networks and the decision to insure.
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 7(2):81–108.
Cai, J. and Song, C. (2017). Do disaster experience and knowledge affect insurance take-up
decisions? Journal of Development Economics, 124:83–94.
Carpena, F., Cole, S. A., Shapiro, J., and Zia, B. (2011). Unpacking the causal chain of
financial literacy. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, (5798).
Carter, M. (2013). Sharing the risk and the uncertainty: public-private reinsurance
partnerships for viable agricultural insurance markets. I4 Index Insurance Innovation
Initiative Brief, 1.
Carter, M., De Janvry, A., Sadoulet, E., Sarris, A., et al. (2014). Index-based weather
insurance for developing countries: A review of evidence and a set of propositions for
up-scaling. Development Policies working paper, 111.
Carter, M. R. (1997). Environment, technology, and the social articulation of risk in west
african agriculture. Economic development and cultural change, 45(3):557–590.
Carter, M. R. and Barrett, C. B. (2006). The economics of poverty traps and persistent
poverty: An asset-based approach. The Journal of Development Studies, 42(2):178–199.
Casaburi, L. and Willis, J. (2018). Time versus state in insurance: Experimental evidence
from contract farming in kenya. American Economic Review, 108(12):3778–3813.
Cassar, A., Crowley, L., and Wydick, B. (2007). The effect of social capital on group loan
repayment: evidence from field experiments. The Economic Journal, 117(517):F85–F106.
Ceballos, F. and Robles, M. (2020). Demand heterogeneity for index-based insurance:
The case for flexible products. Journal of Development Economics, 146:102515.
44 References
Chambers, R. G. (1989). Insurability and moral hazard in agricultural insurance markets.
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 71(3):604–616.
Chandrasekhar, A. G., Kinnan, C., and Larreguy, H. (2018). Social networks as contract
enforcement: Evidence from a lab experiment in the field. American Economic Journal:
Applied Economics, 10(4):43–78.
Churchill, C. and Matul, M. (2006). Protecting the poor. A Micro Insurance Compendium,
Genf: ILO.
Clarke, D. and Wren-Lewis, L. (2013). Learning from lemons: the role of government in
index insurance for individuals. FERDI Policy Brief, (70).
Clarke, D. J. (2016). A theory of rational demand for index insurance. American Economic
Journal: Microeconomics, 8(1):283–306.
Clarke, D. J. and Dercon, S. (2016). Dull Disasters? How planning ahead will make a
difference. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Clement, K. Y., Botzen, W. W., Brouwer, R., and Aerts, J. C. (2018). A global review
of the impact of basis risk on the functioning of and demand for index insurance.
International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, 28:845–853.
Coate, S. and Ravallion, M. (1993). Reciprocity without commitment: Characterization
and performance of informal insurance arrangements. Journal of development Economics,
40(1):1–24.
Coble, K. H., Knight, T. O., Pope, R. D., and Williams, J. R. (1997). An expected-
indemnity approach to the measurement of moral hazard in crop insurance. American
journal of agricultural economics, 79(1):216–226.
Cole, S., Giné, X., Tobacman, J., Topalova, P., Townsend, R., and Vickery, J. (2013).
Barriers to household risk management: Evidence from india. American Economic
Journal: Applied Economics, 5(1):104–35.
Darby, M. R. and Karni, E. (1973). Free competition and the optimal amount of fraud.
The Journal of law and economics, 16(1):67–88.
De Bock, O. and Gelade, W. (2012). The demand for microinsurance: A literature review.
ILO Microinsurance Innovation Facility Research Paper No, 26.
De Janvry, A., Dequiedt, V., and Sadoulet, E. (2014). The demand for insurance against
common shocks. Journal of Development Economics, 106:227–238.
De Janvry, A. and Sadoulet, E. (2020). Using agriculture for development: Supply-and
demand-side approaches. World Development, 133:105003.
De Weerdt, J. (2002). Risk-sharing and endogenous network formation. WIDER Discussion
Paper, (2002/57).
De Weerdt, J. and Dercon, S. (2006). Risk-sharing networks and insurance against illness.
Journal of development Economics, 81(2):337–356.
Dercon, S., De Weerdt, J., Bold, T., and Pankhurst, A. (2006). Group-based funeral
insurance in ethiopia and tanzania. World development, 34(4):685–703.
References 45
Dercon, S., Gunning, J. W., and Zeitlin, A. (2011). The demand for insurance under
limited credibility: Evidence from kenya. In International Development Conference,
DIAL.
Dercon, S., Hill, R. V., Clarke, D., Outes-Leon, I., and Taffesse, A. S. (2014). Offering
rainfall insurance to informal insurance groups: Evidence from a field experiment in
ethiopia. Journal of Development Economics, 106:132–143.
Dercon, S., Hoddinott, J., Krishnan, P., and Woldehanna, T. (2008). Collective action
and vulnerability: Burial societies in rural ethiopia. Available at SSRN 1260274.
Dercon, S., Kirchberger, M., Gunning, J. W., and Platteau, J. P. (2009). Literature review
on microinsurance. ILO.
Di Falco, S. and Bulte, E. (2013). The impact of kinship networks on the adoption of
risk-mitigating strategies in ethiopia. World Development, 43:100–110.
Di Marcantonio, F. and Kayitakire, F. (2017). Review of pilot projects on index-based
insurance in africa: Insights and lessons learned. In Tiepolo, M., Pezzoli, A., and
Tarchiani, V., editors, Renewing Local Planning to Face Climate Change in the Tropics,
pages 323–341. Cham: Springer.
Doherty, N. A. and Richter, A. (2002). Moral hazard, basis risk, and gap insurance.
Journal of Risk and Insurance, 69(1):9–24.
Doherty, N. A. and Schlesinger, H. (1991). Rational insurance purchasing: Consideration
of contract non-performance. In Cummins, D. J. and Derrig, R. A., editors, Managing
the Insolvency Risk of Insurance Companies, pages 283–294. Dordrecht: Springer.
Dror, D. M. and Preker, A. S. (2002). Social reinsurance: a new approach to sustainable
community health financing. The World Bank.
Duflo, E., Kremer, M., and Robinson, J. (2011). Nudging farmers to use fertilizer: Theory
and experimental evidence from kenya. American economic review, 101(6):2350–90.
Easterly, W. and Levine, R. (1997). Africa’s growth tragedy: policies and ethnic divisions.
The quarterly journal of economics, 112(4):1203–1250.
Ekman, B. (2004). Community-based health insurance in low-income countries: a
systematic review of the evidence. Health policy and planning, 19(5):249–270.
Elabed, G., Bellemare, M. F., Carter, M. R., and Guirkinger, C. (2013). Managing basis
risk with multiscale index insurance. Agricultural Economics, 44(4-5):419–431.
Elabed, G. and Carter, M. R. (2015). Compound-risk aversion, ambiguity and the
willingness to pay for microinsurance. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
118:150–166.
Ellsberg, D. (1961). Risk, ambiguity, and the savage axioms. The quarterly journal of
economics, pages 643–669.
Ergas, H., Hornby, J., Little, I., and Small, J. (2001). Regulatory risk. Available at SSRN
1928292.
Eswaran, M. and Kotwal, A. (1990). Implications of credit constraints for risk behaviour
in less developed economies. Oxford economic papers, 42(2):473–482.
46 References
Fafchamps, M. (1992). Solidarity networks in preindustrial societies: Rational peasants
with a moral economy. Economic development and cultural change, 41(1):147–174.
Fafchamps, M. and Gubert, F. (2007). The formation of risk sharing networks. Journal
of development Economics, 83(2):326–350.
Feigenberg, B., Field, E., and Pande, R. (2013). The economic returns to social interaction:
Experimental evidence from microfinance. Review of Economic Studies, 80(4):1459–1483.
Field, C. B., Barros, V., Stocker, T. F., and Dahe, Q. (2012). Managing the risks of
extreme events and disasters to advance climate change adaptation: special report of
the intergovernmental panel on climate change. Cambridge University Press.
Fischer, E. and Qaim, M. (2014). Smallholder farmers and collective action: what
determines the intensity of participation? Journal of Agricultural Economics, 65(3):683–
702.
Fisher, E., Hellin, J., Greatrex, H., and Jensen, N. (2019). Index insurance and climate
risk management: Addressing social equity. Development Policy Review, 37(5):581–602.
Gaurav, S., Cole, S., and Tobacman, J. (2011). Marketing complex financial products
in emerging markets: Evidence from rainfall insurance in india. Journal of marketing
research, 48(SPL):S150–S162.
Gilson, L., Kalyalya, D., Kuchler, F., Lake, S., Oranga, H., and Ouendo, M. (2000).
The equity impacts of community financing activities in three african countries. The
International journal of health planning and management, 15(4):291–317.
Gine, X., Karlan, D., and Ngatia, M. (2013). Social networks, financial literacy and index
insurance. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Giné, X., Townsend, R., and Vickery, J. (2008). Patterns of rainfall insurance participation
in rural india. The World Bank Economic Review, 22(3):539–566.
Gittell, R. and Vidal, A. (1998). Community organizing: Building social capital as a
development strategy. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage.
Granovetter, M. (2018). Economic action and social structure: The problem of
embeddedness. In Granovetter, M. and Swedberg, R., editors, The sociology of economic
life, pages 22–45. Boulder, Colo: Routledge.
Greatrex, H., Hansen, J., Garvin, S., Diro, R., Le Guen, M., Blakeley, S., Rao, K., and
Osgood, D. (2015). Scaling up index insurance for smallholder farmers: Recent evidence
and insights. CGIAR Research Program on Climate Change, Agriculture and Food
Security, (14).
Greif, A. (1993). Contract enforceability and economic institutions in early trade: The
maghribi traders’ coalition. The American economic review, 83(3):525–548.
Hansen, J., Hellin, J., Rosenstock, T., Fisher, E., Cairns, J., Stirling, C., Lamanna, C.,
van Etten, J., Rose, A., and Campbell, B. (2019). Climate risk management and rural
poverty reduction. Agricultural Systems, 172:28–46.
Hauser, O. P., Hilbe, C., Chatterjee, K., and Nowak, M. A. (2019). Social dilemmas
among unequals. Nature, 572(7770):524–527.
References 47
Hazell, P., Anderson, J., Balzer, N., Hastrup Clemmensen, A., Hess, U., and Rispoli,
F. (2010). The potential for scale and sustainability in weather index insurance for
agriculture and rural livelihoods. Technical report, World Food Programme (WFP).
Hazell, P. B. (1992). The appropriate role of agricultural insurance in developing countries.
Journal of International Development, 4(6):567–581.
Hazell, P. B., Norton, R., Parthasarathy, M., and Pomareda, C. (1978). The importance
of risk in agricultural planning models. World Bank.
Heimfarth, L. E. and Musshoff, O. (2011). Weather index-based insurances for farmers in
the north china plain. Agricultural Finance Review, 71(2):218–239.
Hellmuth, M. E., Moorhead, A., Thomas, M. C., and Williams, J. (2007). Climate risk
management in africa: Learning from practice. Climate and Society, (1).
Hellmuth, M. E., Osgood, D. E., Hess, U., Moorhead, A., and Bhojwani, H. (2009).
Index insurance and climate risk: Prospects for development and disaster management.
Technical report, International Research Institute for Climate and Society (IRI).
Hess, U., Skees, J., Stoppa, A., Barnett, B., and Nash, J. (2005). Managing agricultural
production risk: Innovations in developing countries. Agriculture and Rural Development
(ARD) Department Report, (32727-GLB).
Hilbe, C., Chatterjee, K., and Nowak, M. A. (2018a). Partners and rivals in direct
reciprocity. Nature human behaviour, 2(7):469–477.
Hilbe, C., Šimsa, Š., Chatterjee, K., and Nowak, M. A. (2018b). Evolution of cooperation
in stochastic games. Nature, 559(7713):246–249.
Hill, R. V., Hoddinott, J., and Kumar, N. (2013). Adoption of weather-index insurance:
learning from willingness to pay among a panel of households in rural ethiopia.
Agricultural Economics, 44(4-5):385–398.
Hill, R. V., Kumar, N., Magnan, N., Makhija, S., de Nicola, F., Spielman, D. J., and
Ward, P. S. (2019). Ex ante and ex post effects of hybrid index insurance in bangladesh.
Journal of development economics, 136:1–17.
Hölmstrom, B. (1979). Moral hazard and observability. The Bell journal of economics,
pages 74–91.
Holzmann, R. and Jørgensen, S. (2001). Social risk management: A new conceptual
framework for social protection, and beyond. International Tax and Public Finance,
8(4):529–556.
Isik, M. and Devadoss, S. (2006). An analysis of the impact of climate change on crop
yields and yield variability. Applied Economics, 38(7):835–844.
Jensen, N. and Barrett, C. (2017). Agricultural index insurance for development. Applied
Economic Perspectives and Policy, 39(2):199–219.
Jensen, N. D., Barrett, C. B., and Mude, A. G. (2016). Index insurance quality and
basis risk: Evidence from northern kenya. American Journal of Agricultural Economics,
98(5):1450–1469.
48 References
Jütting, J. P. (2004). Do community-based health insurance schemes improve poor people’s
access to health care? evidence from rural senegal. World development, 32(2):273–288.
Kamuzora, P. and Gilson, L. (2007). Factors influencing implementation of the community
health fund in tanzania. Health policy and planning, 22(2):95–102.
Karlan, D., Osei, R., Osei-Akoto, I., and Udry, C. (2014). Agricultural decisions after
relaxing credit and risk constraints. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 129(2):597–
652.
Kellner, U. and Musshoff, O. (2011). Precipitation or water capacity indices? an analysis
of the benefits of alternative underlyings for index insurance. Agricultural Systems,
104(8):645–653.
Kremer, M., Rao, G., and Schilbach, F. (2019). Behavioral development economics. In
Bernheim, D. B., DellaVigna, S., and Laibson, D., editors, Handbook of Behavioral
Economics: Applications and Foundations 1, volume 2, pages 345–458. Amsterdam:
Elsevier.
Krishna, A. (2000). Creating and harnessing social capital. In Dasgupta, P. and Serageldin,
I., editors, Social capital: A multifaceted perspective, pages 71–93. Washington, DC:
The World Bank.
Kunreuther, H. (1996). Mitigating disaster losses through insurance. Journal of risk and
Uncertainty, 12(2):171–187.
Kunreuther, H. and Slovic, P. (1978). Economics, psychology, and protective behavior.
The American Economic Review, 68(2):64–69.
Lyon, F. (2000). Trust, networks and norms: the creation of social capital in agricultural
economies in ghana. World Development, 28(4):663–681.
Mahowald, N., Harrison, L., Shukla, S., and Funk, C. (2012). Can earth system models
be used for impact studies? In AGU Fall Meeting Abstracts, volume 2012, pages
GC32B–02.
Mas, I. and Morawczynski, O. (2009). Designing mobile money services lessons from
m-pesa. Innovations: Technology, Governance, Globalization, 4(2):77–91.
Mas, I. and Radcliffe, D. (2010). Mobile payments go viral: M-pesa in kenya. In Chuhan-
Pole, P. and Angwafo, M., editors, Yes, Africa Can (Success Stories from a Dynamic
Continent). Herndon: World Bank Publications.
McIntosh, C., Povel, F., and Sadoulet, E. (2019). Utility, risk and demand for incomplete
insurance: Lab experiments with guatemalan co-operatives. The Economic Journal,
129(622):2581–2607.
McIntosh, C., Sarris, A., and Papadopoulos, F. (2013). Productivity, credit, risk, and the
demand for weather index insurance in smallholder agriculture in ethiopia. Agricultural
Economics, 44(4-5):399–417.
Merhej, R., Santos, F. P., Melo, F. S., and Santos, F. C. (2021). Cooperation between
independent reinforcement learners under wealth inequality and collective risks. Proc.
of the 20th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems.
References 49
Milinski, M., Sommerfeld, R. D., Krambeck, H.-J., Reed, F. A., and Marotzke, J. (2008).
The collective-risk social dilemma and the prevention of simulated dangerous climate
change. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 105(7):2291–2294.
Miranda, M. J. (1991). Area-yield crop insurance reconsidered. American Journal of
Agricultural Economics, 73(2):233–242.
Miranda, M. J. and Farrin, K. (2012). Index insurance for developing countries. Applied
Economic Perspectives and Policy, 34(3):391–427.
Miranda, M. J. and Glauber, J. W. (1997). Systemic risk, reinsurance, and the failure of
crop insurance markets. American journal of agricultural economics, 79(1):206–215.
Miranda, M. J. and Gonzalez-Vega, C. (2011). Systemic risk, index insurance, and optimal
management of agricultural loan portfolios in developing countries. American Journal
of Agricultural Economics, 93(2):399–406.
Mobarak, A. M. and Rosenzweig, M. R. (2012). Selling formal insurance to the informally
insured. Yale Economics Department Working Paper, (97).
Mobarak, A. M. and Rosenzweig, M. R. (2013). Informal risk sharing, index insurance,
and risk taking in developing countries. American Economic Review, 103(3):375–80.
Morawczynski, O. and Miscione, G. (2008). Examining trust in mobile banking transactions:
The case of m-pesa in kenya. In IFIP International Conference on Human Choice and
Computers, pages 287–298. Springer.
Morduch, J. (1995). Income smoothing and consumption smoothing. Journal of economic
perspectives, 9(3):103–114.
Musshoff, O., Odening, M., and Xu, W. (2011). Management of climate risks in agriculture–
will weather derivatives permeate? Applied economics, 43(9):1067–1077.
Narayan, D. and Pritchett, L. (1999). Cents and sociability: Household income and social
capital in rural tanzania. Economic development and cultural change, 47(4):871–897.
Nigus, H. Y., Nillesen, E., Mohnen, P., et al. (2018). The effect of weather index insurance
on social capital: Experimental evidence from ethiopia. UNU-MERIT Working Paper,
(2018-007).
Norton, M. T., Turvey, C., and Osgood, D. (2013). Quantifying spatial basis risk for
weather index insurance. The Journal of Risk Finance.
Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective
action. Cambridge university press.
Pacheco, J. M., Santos, F. C., and Levin, S. A. (2016). Evolutionary dynamics of collective
index insurance. Journal of mathematical biology, 72(4):997–1010.
Pan, L. (2009). Risk pooling through transfers in rural ethiopia. Economic Development
and Cultural Change, 57(4):809–835.
Panda, A., Lambert, P. J., and Surminski, S. (2020). Insurance and financial services
across developing countries: an empirical study of coverage and demand. Centre for
Climate Change Economics and Policy Working Paper, 367.
50 References
Patt, A., Peterson, N., Carter, M., Velez, M., Hess, U., and Suarez, P. (2009). Making
index insurance attractive to farmers. Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global
Change, 14(8):737–753.
Patt, A., Suarez, P., and Hess, U. (2010). How do small-holder farmers understand
insurance, and how much do they want it? evidence from africa. Global Environmental
Change, 20(1):153–161.
Platteau, J.-P., De Bock, O., and Gelade, W. (2017). The demand for microinsurance: A
literature review. World Development, 94:139–156.
Pradhan, K. C. and Mukherjee, S. (2018). Covariate and idiosyncratic shocks and coping
strategies for poor and non-poor rural households in india. Journal of Quantitative
Economics, 16(1):101–127.
Putnam, R. (1993). The prosperous community: Social capital and public life. In Blair,
K., Murphy, R. M., and Almjeld, J., editors, Cross Currents: Cultures, Communities,
Technologies, volume 13. Wadsworth: Cengage Learning.
Quiggin, J., Karagiannis, G., and Stanton, J. (1994). Crop insurance and crop production:
an empirical study of moral hazard and adverse selection. In Hueth, D. L. and Furtan,
W. H., editors, Economics of agricultural crop insurance: theory and evidence, pages
253–272. Dordrecht: Springer.
Ravallion, M. and Chen, S. (2007). Absolute poverty measures for the developing world,
1981-2004. The World Bank.
Rosenzweig, M. R. and Stark, O. (1989). Consumption smoothing, migration, and
marriage: Evidence from rural india. Journal of political Economy, 97(4):905–926.
Rosenzweig, M. R. and Wolpin, K. I. (1993). Credit market constraints, consumption
smoothing, and the accumulation of durable production assets in low-income countries:
Investments in bullocks in india. Journal of political economy, 101(2):223–244.
Santos, F. P., Pacheco, J. M., Santos, F. C., and Levin, S. A. (2021). Dynamics of informal
risk sharing in collective index insurance. Nature Sustainability, pages 1–7.
Sibiko, K. W., Veettil, P. C., and Qaim, M. (2018). Small farmers’ preferences for weather
index insurance: insights from kenya. Agriculture & Food Security, 7(1):1–14.
Skees, J. R. (2008). Innovations in index insurance for the poor in lower income countries.
Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, 37(1):1–15.
Skees, J. R., Barnett, B. J., et al. (2006). Enhancing microfinance using index-based
risk-transfer products. Agricultural Finance Review, 66(2):235.
Skees, J. R. et al. (2001). Developing rainfall-based index insurance in Morocco, volume
2577. World Bank Publications.
Skees, J. R. et al. (2008). Challenges for use of index-based weather insurance in lower
income countries. Agricultural Finance Review, 68(1):197.
Skees, J. R. and Reed, M. R. (1986). Rate making for farm-level crop insurance:
Implications for adverse selection. American Journal of Agricultural Economics,
68(3):653–659.
References 51
Smith, V. H. and Goodwin, B. K. (1996). Crop insurance, moral hazard, and agricultural
chemical use. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 78(2):428–438.
Tabor, S. R. et al. (2005). Community-based health insurance and social protection policy.
World Bank, Washington: Social Protection Discussion Paper Series.
Tang, Y., Cai, H., and Liu, R. (2021). Farmers’ demand for informal risk management
strategy and weather index insurance: Evidence from china. International Journal of
Disaster Risk Science, pages 1–17.
The World Bank (2007). Agriculture for development. Washington DC: The World Bank.
Townsend, R. M. (1994). Risk and insurance in village india. Econometrica: Journal of
the Econometric Society, pages 539–591.
Townsend, R. M. (1995). Consumption insurance: An evaluation of risk-bearing systems
in low-income economies. Journal of Economic perspectives, 9(3):83–102.
Trærup, S. L. (2012). Informal networks and resilience to climate change impacts: a
collective approach to index insurance. Global Environmental Change, 22(1):255–267.
Uphoff, N. and Wijayaratna, C. M. (2000). Demonstrated benefits from social capital:
the productivity of farmer organizations in gal oya, sri lanka. World development,
28(11):1875–1890.
Uslaner, E. M. (2002). The moral foundations of trust. Cambridge University Press.
Valdés, A., Hazell, P., and Pomareda, C. (1986). Crop insurance for agricultural
development: Issues and experience. IICA Biblioteca Venezuela.
Vasilaky, K., Sáenz, S. M., Stanimirova, R., and Osgood, D. (2020). Perceptions of farm
size heterogeneity and demand for group index insurance. Games, 11(1):15.
Woolcock, M. (1998). Social capital and economic development: Toward a theoretical
synthesis and policy framework. Theory and society, 27(2):151–208.
Woolcock, M. and Narayan, D. (2006). Social capital: Implications for development theory,
research, and policy revisited. The search for empowerment: Social capital as idea and
practice at the World Bank, pages 31–62.
World Bank (2011). Weather index insurance for agriculture: guidance for development
practitioners. World Bank.
World Health Organization (2020). Community-based health insurance. Obtained
from: https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/community-based-health-
insurance-2020. Read: 2021.05.26.
